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INTRODUCTION 
On November 19, 2009, Dan Glickman, the then-Chairman and 
CEO of the Motion Picture Association of America (“MPAA”), 
wrote a letter to Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont in support of a 
“sound and comprehensive” Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(“ACTA”).1 After eleven rounds of intense negotiation, ACTA has 
 
 *   Mr. Levine is an Assistant Professor at Elon University School of Law, an 
Affiliate Scholar at Stanford Law School’s Center for Internet and Society, and the 
founder and host of Hearsay Culture on KZSU-FM (Stanford University). Thanks 
to Daniel Nicotera and Anna Arnopolsky for their research assistance, and Eric 
Fink, Andy Haile, Tom Molony, Frank Pasquale, Michael Rich, Chris Sprigman, 
and Peter Yu for their comments and suggestions. Thanks also to the organizers 
and participants at the American University Washington College of Law’s Public 
Interest Analysis of the International Intellectual Property Enforcement 
Agenda Workshop in June 2010 and the editors of the American University 
International Law Review. Any errors or omissions are my own. 
 1. Letter from Dan Glickman, Chairman and Chief Exec. Officer, Motion 
Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc., to Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, U.S. Senate Judiciary 
Comm. (Nov. 19, 2009) [hereinafter Glickman Letter], available at 
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been described by the United States Trade Representative (“USTR”), 
the entity representing the United States in the negotiations, as 
intended to “establish a state-of-the-art international framework that 
provides a model for effectively combating global proliferation of 
commercial-scale counterfeiting and piracy in the 21st century.”2 
Indeed, given the endorsement from the Group of Eight (“G-8”), 
ACTA will likely become one of the most significant international 
agreements regarding intellectual property laws in history, a “new 
international framework.”3  
The existence of a major international agreement addressing a 
significant legal problem is enough to warrant considerable public 
interest. Though ACTA has garnered much public attention, the 
substance of ACTA is at times overshadowed by the negotiation 
process.4 In his letter to Senator Leahy, Glickman addressed the 
major procedural problem in ACTA―one that has nearly eclipsed 
any substantive questions: the lack of transparency and 
accountability in the negotiations.5 Glickman dismissed those public 
concerns about the lack of transparency in ACTA’s negotiations as a 
“distraction,” and he also labeled “opponents of ACTA” as 
“indifferent to [the film industry’s] situation, or actively hostile 
toward efforts to improve copyright enforcement worldwide.”6 
Glickman was and is correct that the concern for transparency 
diverts public attention from ACTA’s substance and its 
 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/22785108/MPAA-letter-re-ACTA. 
 2. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), OFF. U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/acta (last visited Mar. 1, 2011). The USTR 
is the government entity representing the United States in negotiations. 
 3. See G-8 Declarations on Economy, Environment, WALL ST. J. (July 8, 
2008, 2:25 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121549460313835333.html 
(declaring the advancement of anti-counterfeiting and piracy initiatives to be a 
critical part of the G-8’s plan to increase protection of intellectual property rights). 
 4. See, e.g., Glickman Letter, supra note 1 (petitioning Senator Leahy to 
support the USTR’s efforts in the ACTA negotiations and expressing the concern 
that complaints about ACTA’s alleged lack of transparency were blocking 
“meaningful dialogue” on the agreement’s substantive provisions); Sunlight for 
ACTA, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://secure.eff.org/site/Advocacy?cmd= 
display&page=UserAction&id=383 (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) (lamenting that the 
public had scant opportunity to comment on or obtain information about ACTA 
despite the fact that the agreement could potentially harm both consumers and 
technological innovation). 
 5. Glickman Letter, supra note 1. 
 6. Id. 
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“ambition . . . to work with key trading partners to combat piracy and 
counterfeiting across the global marketplace.”7 However, Glickman 
understated the impact of the lack of transparency on both the 
governmental procedures and the substance of the law. This article 
seeks to address that “distraction” by answering a basic question: 
what can we learn about the creation of international intellectual 
property law in the Internet age from the secrecy efforts of the 
USTR, particularly in light of the marginal use of exemptions to the 
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”)? Although the agreement is 
not yet final, we already know that the lack of transparency placed 
leaked documents and hearsay at the center of public policy 
discussions, caused debates over both real and imagined issues, and 
brought about a general erosion of public knowledge and confidence 
in the ACTA process.8  
The reason for these problems is that the USTR has attempted to 
keep the ACTA negotiations in the proverbial black box; the public 
knows that a box exists and that USTR (and others) are working 
therein, but they cannot open it to discover and examine what’s 
inside. This article observes that an ACTA black box has proven 
impossible to maintain.9 The USTR’s antiquated views about what 
the public can and should know about ACTA, and when the public 
should know it, attest to the urgency of this realization.  
In September 2009, Knowledge Ecology International made a 
FOIA request to the USTR seeking “all records at USTR on the topic 
of the policy and practice of USTR regard [sic] the transparency of 
trade negotiations,” including ACTA.10 An incomplete response was 
received in October 2009, but among the produced documents was 
an email between USTR employees dated February 10, 2009, 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. See, e.g., Intellectual Property Appears to Figure Prominently in Wikileaks 
Cablegate, MICHAEL GEIST BLOG (Nov. 29, 2010), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/ 
content/blogsection/0/125/10/80/ (discussing leaked U.S. State Department cables 
referring to the ACTA negotiations and evaluating the varying attitudes of 
lobbying groups towards specific provisions of ACTA and the proposed legislation 
in the United States). 
 9. This reality is evidenced by the numerous drafts leaked online at various 
points during the negotiation process. See infra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 10. James Love, USTR’s February 10, 2009 Memo on Transparency Soup, 
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Sept. 8, 2010, 10:00 PM), http://keionline.org/ 
node/929. 
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authored by Stan McCoy, the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative 
for Intellectual Property and Innovation. This email, which had the 
subject line “transparency soup,” included a draft USTR position 
paper on ACTA transparency with the following question and 
answer in FAQ (frequently asked question) format: “Q[uestion]: 
What if U.S. positions evolve during negotiations? [Answer:] The 
public can see how the U.S. position has evolved when the final text 
is signed.”11 Without knowing better, one might view this response 
as a gallows-humor joke response to a legitimate question. 
Unfortunately, it was not a joke and, although stated in a draft 
document, accurately reflects the dismissive view of transparency 
and accountability that has been the hallmark of USTR’s handling of 
the ACTA negotiations. Additionally, even if such secrecy is 
desirable to the USTR, it has proven to be untenable and unrealistic, 
and thus bad policy no matter how it is viewed. Policies built on 
significant false assumptions naturally run a high risk of failure. 
As discussed below, in the case of ACTA, the effects of the 
USTR’s failed policy have already begun to emerge. For example, 
because the negotiators tried but failed to keep absolute secrecy 
about the logistics of the negotiations and the substance of the 
agreement, they could not enjoy the usual benefit of secrecy—
namely, a smooth and efficient process―and do not appear to be 
offering us better law. Thus, despite Glickman’s assertions, 
transparency has become as important in the ACTA negotiations as 
the agreement’s substance precisely because the substance would 
likely be different if there had been greater transparency and 
accountability.12 Though the MPAA would likely not agree, those 
 
 11. Id. As of February 2009, after only four rounds of ACTA negotiations, two 
leaks of ACTA negotiating documents had already occurred. See The ACTA 
Timeline: Tracing the Secret Copyright Treaty, MICHAEL GEIST BLOG (Dec. 10, 
2009), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/4611/125 [hereinafter ACTA 
Timeline]. The details of the negotiations have been widely discussed on the 
Internet. See, e.g., James Love, Details Emerge of Secret ACTA Negotiation, 
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Feb. 3, 2009, 3:38 PM), http://keionline.org/ 
blogs/2009/02/03/details-emerge-of-secret-acta (reporting the substance of the 
supposedly secret negotiations). This fact alone suggests that the USTR’s cavalier 
position was already fantastical. 
 12. See Glickman Letter, supra note 1 (discounting the validity of criticisms of 
transparency, but admitting their continued presence and possible effect on the 
substance of ACTA); Sunlight for ACTA, supra note 4 (urging the public to contact 
their representatives so that there is “meaningful consultation” regarding the 
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differences probably would have improved ACTA’s substance from 
a viewpoint that intelligently balances the interests of all concerned.  
From a broader perspective, and equally important, the ACTA 
negotiations have revealed an emerging trend in freedom of 
information scenarios where the government and commercial 
interests, working closely together, appear to have a mutual interest 
in keeping information of significant national concern from the 
public. Ultimately, this article proposes that the MPAA, and the 
public generally, would have been better served by an open and 
transparent ACTA process that was accountable to the public from 
its inception. In fact, there may have been fewer “opponents of 
ACTA” as a result, and resources would not have been wasted on 
largely futile secrecy efforts. Given the inefficient policy produced 
by secretive government negotiations, FOIA must be reconsidered to 
reflect the current state of technology in the era of WikiLeaks, and 
public/private relationships.  
I. THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 
In order to understand the context within which the bulk of the 
ACTA negotiations have transpired, it is important to note the 
current trends in federal government transparency. During his first 
day as President of the United States, Barack Obama issued a 
“memorandum for the heads of executive departments and agencies” 
regarding the FOIA,13 a federal act that mandates open government 
with certain exceptions.14 In the first sentence of the memorandum, 
President Obama noted that “[a] democracy requires accountability, 
and accountability requires transparency . . . . In the face of doubt, 
openness prevails.”15 As part of the directive, President Obama 
ordered the Attorney General to “issue new [FOIA] guidelines” and 
the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) to “update 
guidance” to the agencies in order to “usher in a new era of open 
Government.”16 The Attorney General issued a memorandum on 
 
negotiation of ACTA). 
 13. Memorandum from President Barack Obama on the Freedom of 
Information Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 4683 (Jan. 21, 2009). 
 14. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). 
 15. Memorandum from President Barack Obama on the Freedom of 
Information Act, 74 Fed. Reg. at 4683. 
 16. Id. 
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March 19, 2009, laying out two primary instructions for how federal 
agencies should respond to FOIA requests based upon President 
Obama’s memorandum: “First, an agency should not withhold 
information simply because it may do so legally. . . . Second, 
whenever an agency determines that it cannot make full disclosure of 
a requested record, it must consider whether it can make partial 
disclosure.”17 As discussed in more detail below, this is a 
fundamental reorientation of how agencies respond to FOIA 
requests.  
The OMB took a bit more time to present its guidance to agencies, 
but it did so on December 8, 2009 in the potentially groundbreaking 
Open Government Directive (the “OMB Memorandum”).18 The 
OMB Memorandum requires federal agencies to “take specific 
actions to implement the principles of transparency, participation, 
and collaboration set forth in the President’s Memorandum.”19 This 
effort has been hailed as a potential “watershed moment for 
democracy, the likes of which can forever change the relationship 
between the government and the public it serves.”20 It has already 
resulted in agencies moving toward releasing data on the Internet, 
making data available for download at no cost to the user, and 
disclosing previously unreleased documents for public inspection.21 
Indeed, every cabinet department is supposed to unveil a “new open 
government project.”22 
 
 17. Memorandum from Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., to the Heads of Exec. 
Dep’ts and Agencies (Mar. 19, 2009), available at www.usdoj.gov/ag/foia-memo-
march2009.pdf. 
 18. Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Director, Exec. Office of the 
President, to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies (Dec. 8, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ assets/memoranda_2010/m10-06.pdf. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Ellen Miller, A Watershed Moment in Transparency and Accountability, 
SUNLIGHT FOUND. BLOG (Dec. 11, 2009, 5:48 P.M.), http://blog.sunlight 
foundation.com/2009/12/11/a-watershed-moment-in-transparency-and-
accountability. 
 21. See Miranda Fleschert, White House Announces 20 Agency Open 
Government Initiatives, REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM PRESS (Dec. 10, 
2009, 3:50 PM), http://www.rcfp.org/newsitems/index.php?i=11165 (mentioning 
plans by the Departments of Defense, State, Agriculture, Transportation and others 
to release electronically data ranging from updates on the Sudanese conflict in 
Darfur to nutrition facts about certain foods). 
 22. See Norm Eisen & Beth Noveck, Why an Open Government Matters, OPEN 
GOV’T INITIATIVE (Dec. 9, 2009, 3:16 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
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To understand the significance of these developments, it is 
important to note the general trend since the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001. Since 9/11, commentators have found that the 
United States government generally errs on the side of secrecy.23 
Moreover, there has been increased use of the designation “Sensitive 
But Unclassified” by U.S. government agencies. This designation is 
often found on research and scientific or technological information 
generated by the government post-9/11, and allows for such 
information to be shielded from public view.24 Thus, Obama’s FOIA 
memorandum has the potential to scale back the excessive, post-9/11 
secrecy, and thereby catalyze a re-imagination of the relationship 
between government and citizens at the federal, state, and local 
levels.25 
Unfortunately, throughout the ACTA negotiations the federal 
government has taken positions that favor secrecy and undermine 
optimism for fundamental change. Indeed, U.S. government 
positions concerning the commercial interests of the industries most 
impacted by ACTA, as well as the other scenarios discussed below, 
may reveal a disturbing trend where the government has begun to 
 
blog/2009/12/09/why-open-government-matters (describing the White House 
Directive that initiated the renewed emphasis on open government, and describing 
its effect on federal agencies). 
 23. See Peter P. Swire, A Theory of Disclosure for Security and Competitive 
Reasons: Open Source, Proprietary Software, and Government Agencies, 42 
HOUS. L. REV. 1333, 1378 (2006) (decrying the post-9/11 boilerplate policy of 
classifying documents as resulting in excessive secrecy and agency self-
protection). This does not always mean that information remains secret, but 
administrative errors are untenable as a basis of a disclosure regime. See Iain 
Thomson, US Army Posted Secrets on the Web, V3.CO.UK (July 12, 2007), 
http://www.v3.co.uk/vnunet/news/2194072/army-posting-secrets-web (reporting 
that the U.S. Army and its contractors accidentally posted military secrets on the 
web). 
 24. See generally GENEVIEVE J. KNEZO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33303, 
“SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED” INFORMATION AND OTHER CONTROLS: POLICY 
AND OPTIONS FOR SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION 2-16 (2006) 
(reviewing past federal policies governing the release of scientific and technical 
information and making recommendations to streamline current policies, including 
limiting the number of those responsible for designating information as “sensitive 
but unclassified” and centralizing the information disclosure policies). 
 25. But see Andrew Malcolm, A Little Secret About Obama’s Transparency, 
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2010, at A28 (reporting that an Associated Press examination 
of seventeen major agencies' FOIA request responses resulted in 466,872 
denials―“an increase of nearly 50% from the 2008 fiscal year under Bush”). 
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assert aggressively the commercial interests of a private entity in 
denying FOIA requests on issues of national importance. Such a 
lopsided government policy gives commercial interests a favored 
position over the public in accessing otherwise-secret information.  
Nonetheless, in each situation discussed below, the initial efforts 
to withhold information have been largely overcome by public 
pressure. While full disclosure has not been achieved, significant 
information has eventually reached the public, and in some 
circumstances disclosure is currently being litigated. This reality 
should cause policymakers to consider whether fights over secrecy 
are worth the battle if some or all of the information sought will 
eventually be disclosed—or, as in the case of ACTA, leaked. The 
following three examples are illustrative of the problem. 
A. BLOOMBERG L.P. V. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL 
RESERVE SYSTEM 
A startling example analogous to the ACTA situation occurred 
towards the end of President George W. Bush’s administration. On 
November 7, 2008, Bloomberg L.P. (“Bloomberg”) filed a complaint 
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York against the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
(“Fed”).26 The case involved a FOIA request made by Bloomberg to 
the Fed in May 2008, asking the Fed to “disclose the recipients of 
more than $2 trillion of emergency loans from U.S. taxpayers and the 
assets the central bank is accepting as collateral.”27 After months of 
not receiving a substantive response to the request, Bloomberg 
alleged in their complaint:  
The government documents that Bloomberg seeks are central to 
understanding and assessing the government’s response to the most 
cataclysmic financial crisis in America since the Great Depression. The 
 
 26. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Bloomberg L.P. v. Bd. of 
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 649 F. Supp. 2d 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 08-
CV-9595), 2008 WL 8066871. 
 27. Mark Pittman, Fed Refuses to Disclose Recipients of $2 Trillion, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 12, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
newsarchive&sid=aGvwttDayiiM; see FOIA Requests from Bloomberg News 
Serv. to the Fed. Reserve Bd. (Feb. 21, 2009), available at http://www.scribd.com/ 
doc/12760404/Bloomberg-News-FOIA-Request-Federal-Reserve-Board 
(cataloguing every FOIA request sent from Bloomberg to the Fed). 
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effect of that crisis on the American public has been and will continue to 
be devastating. Hundreds of corporations are announcing layoffs in 
response to the crisis, and the economy was the top issue for many 
Americans in the recent elections.28 
Bloomberg’s request sought documents disclosing the terms of the 
Fed lending programs,29 and their complaint explained the 
significance of the information sought, from a transparency 
perspective: 
In response to the crisis, the Fed has vastly expanded its lending programs 
to private financial institutions. To obtain access to this public money and 
to safeguard the taxpayers’ interests, borrowers are required to post 
collateral. Despite the manifest public interest in such matters, however, 
none of the programs themselves make reference to any public disclosure 
of the posted collateral or of the Fed’s methods in valuing it. Thus, while 
the taxpayers are the ultimate counterparty for the collateral, they have 
not been given any information regarding the kind of collateral received, 
how it was valued, or by whom [it was valued].30 
After the complaint was filed, but before it was answered, the Fed 
responded to the request in a five page letter.31 The Fed noted that it 
had located responsive documents,32 but decided to withhold these 
“approximately 231 full pages of information” because, among other 
reasons, they contained confidential commercial information.33 
Although FOIA does protect privately-held, commercially 
valuable information,34 it is disturbing that the government seemingly 
went out of its way to protect commercial interests in the context of 
an unprecedented bank loan program where the taxpayers had an at-
risk exposure of $2 trillion. For example, the Fed noted that it “has to 
be and is mindful of the commercial and financial interests of 
 
 28. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 26, ¶ 2. 
 29. E.g., Pittman, supra note 27. 
 30. Id. ¶ 3. 
 31. Letter from Jennifer J. Johnson, Sec’y of the Bd., Bd. of Governors of the 
Fed. Reserve Sys., to Mark Pittman, Bloomberg (Dec. 9, 2008) [hereinafter 
Johnson Letter] (on file with American University International Law Review). 
 32. See id. (mentioning that these documents included reports “containing 
certain information (specifically, the names of participants, originating Federal 
Reserve Bank district, names of borrowers, individual loan amounts and 
origination and maturity dates)”). 
 33. Id. 
 34. 5 U.S.C. § 552(c)(4) (2006). 
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borrowers, [and] the institutions whose collateral secured the 
borrowings.”35 It explained that “institutions that may potentially 
borrow [from the Fed] recognize that counterparts and market 
analysts may draw adverse inferences about their financial health if 
the institutions have turned to [the Fed] and, for that reason, such 
institutions can be extremely concerned about the stigma of 
borrowing [from the Fed].”36 Thus, disclosure would “harm 
individual borrowers’ competitiveness.”37 
While arguing that such secrecy protects the interests of the 
taxpayer and the Fed in administering the loan program, the Fed is 
asserting, in part, that it also protects the commercial interests of its 
borrowers in denying the request. However, as Bloomberg explains 
in their complaint, the public’s interest is magnified by the Fed’s 
risky policies and the effects of the on-going financial crisis on the 
American economy.38 In the battle between commercial interests of 
private entities and the public’s right to know, the federal 
government and FOIA have become proxies for the former, and are 
being used to control the flow of information regarding corporate 
entities to the public.39 Here, the commercial entities get favored 
treatment by virtue of their commercial dealings with the 
government, and, hence, know far more about the operations of the 
Fed than the public that funds it. Indeed, in a related Bloomberg 
FOIA request to the Fed (that resulted in the production of 560 pages 
of marginally relevant and heavily redacted emails some twenty 
months after they were requested), one commentator described FOIA 
as “honorable and useful” as long as you are “not asking for 
information about the bank bailout,” willing to wait years for the 
information, and “don’t mind if the requested documents are 95% 
blacked out when you finally get them.”40 
 
 35. Johnson Letter, supra note 31. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 26, ¶ 19. 
 39. Importantly, Bloomberg was ultimately successful in court. Bloomberg, 
L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 649 F. Supp. 2d 262, 282 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 601 F.3d 143, 151 (2d. Cir. 2010); Mark Pittman, Court 
Orders Fed to Disclose Emergency Bank Loans, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 25, 2009), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a7CC61ZsieV4. 
However, as of this writing, the Fed has not produced the requested documents. 
 40. Katya Wachtel, Fed Gives Bloomberg the Lamest FOIA Document Ever, as 
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The impact of such a partnership raises disturbing issues about the 
dual role of government as both a commercial lender and defender of 
the public’s interests. Policymakers must question whether the 
government can play these dual roles without compromising the 
public’s right to know, especially where there is strong public 
interest in timely disclosure of the information. 
B. BRITISH PETROLEUM AND COREXIT 
In the wake of the massive British Petroleum (“BP”) Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill, Nalco Company’s (“Nalco”) COREXIT dispersants 
were used to mitigate damages associated with the spill.41 This is 
problematic because unlimited use of COREXIT “could [have] 
cause[d] unknown risks to human and marine health.”42 After 
requests for Nalco to publicly release information about COREXIT’s 
formula so that researchers could attempt to ascertain the potential 
impact of its widespread use,43 both the Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”) and Nalco released the ingredients to the public,44 
but shielded the exact concentration formula of the chemicals, stating 
that they are trade secrets. 
The exact formula for COREXIT, the use of which has been 
 




 41. See Erick Kraemer, What is COREXIT and Why is it Still Being Used in the 
Gulf, DISASTER ACCOUNTABILITY BLOG (July 28, 2010), http://blog.disaster 
accountability.com/2010/07/28/what-is-corexit-and-why-is-it-still-being-used-in-
the-gulf (noting that the dispersal of millions of liters of COREXIT into the Gulf of 
Mexico was the largest use of such chemicals in U.S. history). 
 42. See Anne C. Mulkern, Maker of Controversial Dispersant Used in Gulf Oil 
Spill Hires Top Lobbyists, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
gwire/2010/06/25/25greenwire-maker-of-controversial-dispersant-used-in-gulf-
94328.html (reporting that the EPA and the U.S. Coast Guard eventually ordered 
BP to stop using the chemical). 
 43. Press Release, Earthjustice, Conservation Groups Act to Uncover What’s 
In Gulf Oil Dispersants (July 14, 2010), http://www.earthjustice.org/news/press/ 
2010/conservation-groups-act-to-uncover-what-s-in-gulf-oil-dispersants. 
 44. David Biello, Is Using Dispersants on the BP Gulf Oil Spill Fighting 
Pollution with Pollution? SCIENTIFIC AM. (June 18, 2010), http://www.scientific 
american.com/article.cfm?id=is-using-dispersants-fighting-pollution-with-
pollution. 
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banned in the United Kingdom,45 is held by the EPA. Due to a 
general dearth of information regarding the impact of the chemical, 
the Gulf Restoration Network and the Florida Wildlife Federation 
made a FOIA request to the EPA for health and safety data regarding 
the dispersant.46 After failing to receive a response to their request, 
the parties brought an action against the EPA seeking “data and 
studies submitted to EPA pursuant to [relevant federal environmental 
laws] regarding dispersants and their constituents, and un-redacted 
copies of communications between EPA and BP concerning the use 
of dispersants during the response to the BP Deepwater Horizon oil 
spill.”47  
Presumably, the EPA would take the position that the requested 
information is a trade secret and/or confidential commercial 
information under FOIA.48 Indeed, the EPA would likely be correct, 
revealing a separate problem in FOIA.49 But, even if FOIA operates 
as an impediment to disclosure of some information, it is not an 
impediment to disclosure of all information unless the administrative 
agency holding the information willfully slows down the process. 
Such was the case here. The EPA’s delay in releasing the 
components that make up COREXIT was a direct result of the 
agency’s preference for protecting the interests of Nalco and BP over 
the public’s interest. Accordingly, the watchdog group OMB Watch 
issued the following criticism of EPA upon its release of COREXIT 
 
 45. See id. (noting that the use of COREXIT is banned in the U.K. because of a 
failure to pass the “limpet test”―where the product is sprayed on rocks to seeing if 
“limpets, (a type of small mollusk) can still cling to them”). Nalco therefore claims 
that the product is not intended for use on rocky shorelines, but instead for open 
sea waters. Id. 
 46. Complaint for Injunctive Relief ¶ 20, Fla. Wildlife Fed’n, Inc. v. EPA, No. 
10-293 (N.D. Fla. July 14, 2010), 2010 WL 2884458. 
 47. Id. As of this writing, the action is ongoing. See EPA Reveals What’s in 
Gulf Oil Spill Dispersants, GULF OIL SPILL (Dec. 30, 2010), http://www.gulfspill 
oil.com/updated-epa-reveals-whats-in-gulf-oil-spill-dispersants (announcing that 
the EPA eventually released data on the chemical compounds used in the Gulf oil 
spill, but also reporting that the Gulf Restoration Network and Florida Wildlife 
Federation have hired experts to assess the data provided by the EPA and 
determine whether the chemicals used were truly toxic). 
 48. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(c)(4) (2006). 
 49. See generally David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade 
Secrets in Our Public Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135 (2007) (analyzing FOIA 
and advocating for governmental “transparency and accountability” over strict 
protections for commercial trade secrets). 
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data: 
After weeks of gallon after gallon [of COREXIT] pouring into the Gulf, 
finally the public is given the most basic information crucial to 
monitoring the fate and impacts of these chemicals. EPA had the authority 
to act all along; its decision to now disclose the ingredients demonstrates 
this. Yet it took a public outcry and weeks of complaints for the agency to 
act and place the public’s interest ahead of corporate interests.50  
Here, as seen in Bloomberg and the ACTA negotiations, continual 
public pressure on the EPA forced the agency to release information 
that it would have preferred to keep secret. In doing so, the EPA 
risked the scorn of corporate interests, and legitimately caused the 
public to question where the EPA’s loyalties and political interests 
lie.51 But still, FOIA remains an impediment to the dissemination of 
information, as public pressure alone cannot change the language of 
the law. 
C. ACTA 
FOIA has been interpreted to exist, in part, to prevent the 
development of “secret law.”52 Yet, the ACTA negotiations’ lack of 
transparency heightens concerns that “secret law” is precisely what is 
being developed. Here, the focus is not the power of the purse, or 
public health and safety concerns, but another fundamental role of 
government: lawmaking. In the ACTA context, FOIA requests from 
Knowledge Ecology International (“KEI”) to the USTR in the early 
days of the Obama administration were met with responses similar to 
those received by Bloomberg. In January 2009, KEI sought seven 
specific documents that reflected proposals for the substantive text of 
ACTA.53 In a summary response in March 2009, around the same 
 
 50. Brian Turnbaugh, EPA Finally Discloses What’s in the Oil Spill 
Dispersants, OMB WATCH (June 8, 2010), http://www.ombwatch.org/node/11062. 
 51. Cf. Mulkern, supra note 42 (discussing the role of lobbyists in EPA 
investigations of companies like Nalco and explaining that because the EPA “has a 
lot of leverage,” companies being investigated by the agency often employ 
lobbyists who can advocate for them as a counterbalance to the EPA’s 
investigative power). 
 52. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Privacy and the Optimal Extent of 
Disclosure Under the Freedom of Information Act, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 775, 777 
(1980) (looking to FOIA’s indexing and reading-room rules as indications that the 
Act’s “primary objective is the elimination of ‘secret law’”). 
 53. See James Love, Obama Administration Rules Texts of New IPR Agreement 
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time as the OMB Memorandum, the USTR denied the request, citing 
an exemption to FOIA for “information that is properly classified in 
the interest of national security.”54 Upon receipt of the denial letter, 
KEI’s director, James Love, explained:  
The texts are available to the Japanese government. They are available to 
the 27 member states of the European Union. They are available to the 
governments of Canada, Mexico, New Zealand, Australia . . . and many 
other countries. They are available to “cleared” advisers (mostly well 
connected lobbyists) for the pharmaceutical, software, entertainment and 
publishing industries. But they are a secret from you, the public.55 
Again, while the law may support such a denial by the USTR, a 
disturbing reality has emerged. Just as the Fed asserted the interests 
of commercial borrowers in fighting Bloomberg’s FOIA request, 
thereby maintaining the borrowers’ superior knowledge about the 
loan program, the USTR has elevated commercial interests over the 
general interests of the public. The result has been distribution of 
information―generally unavailable to the public through non-
disclosure agreements (“NDAs”)―to (primarily) corporate entities 
and their proxies.56 These special groups apparently have their own 
freedom of information rules. The public has no opportunity to sign a 
NDA and cannot obtain the real-time information to which these 
special groups are privy.57 The result is that these NDA-signing 
entities and/or “cleared advisors” are far better positioned to offer 
timely, meaningful input than the public. Information disparities like 
this, which are fueled rather than rectified by an open government 
 
are State Secrets, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 12, 2009), http://www.huffington 
post.com/james-love/obama-administration-rule_b_174450.html (reporting that the 
documents sought by KEI were widely available to lobbyists and foreign 
government officials, but not the U.S. public). 
 54. Id.; see 5 U.S.C. § 552(c)(1). 
 55. Love, supra note 53. 
 56. See James Love, White House Shares the ACTA Internet Text with 42 
Washington Insiders, Under Non Disclosure Agreements, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY 
INT’L (Oct. 13, 2009, 4:10 PM), http://keionline.org/node/660 (naming individuals 
allowed to view secret documents pursuant to NDAs). Indeed, when KEI requested 
the names of the entities that had signed a NDA and received a copy of the ACTA 
text, the USTR’s initial response was to deny it, again “on the grounds that the 
release of the names of persons who had seen the text would undermine the 
national security of the United States.” Id. 
 57.  KEI was one of the few non-commercial entities given an opportunity to 
sign a NDA. Id. 
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law, should give us pause, especially when that open government law 
is FOIA.  
More strikingly, this broad power of the USTR to control the flow 
of information through FOIA is not an accident. Rather, the USTR’s 
power is derived from the Obama administration’s choice to continue 
designating ACTA as an Executive Agreement, thus by-passing 
Congress and the traditional transparent format for negotiating 
international agreements.58 This choice has resulted in a stunning 
lack of transparency, as compared to a variety of international 
institutions that facilitate international agreements, including the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”), the World 
Trade Organization (“WTO”), the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, the Commission on Science and 
Technology for Development, and the Internet Governance Forum.59 
Aside from official drafts released late in the negotiating process, the 
public has had to rely on guesswork and speculation based upon 
leaked texts and rumors to ascertain the status of ACTA’s 
negotiations.  
Consequently, ACTA’s lack of transparency has mutated what 
would otherwise have been a largely public debate about ACTA’s 
merits and terms into a hearsay-laden, speculative melee. This is a 
policy choice made by the Obama administration that has given 
corporate entities a “most favored nation” status and limited real 
benefits to the negotiation process or the public. In summary, 
intellectual property law agreements have apparently become issues 
of national security that require the input of commercial interests but 
not the public at large. As Peter Yu points out, this “national 
security” concern is “more correctly identified with the maintenance 
of good foreign or diplomatic relations with ACTA negotiating 
 
 58. Eddan Katz, Stopping the ACTA Juggernaut, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUND. (Nov. 19, 2009), http://www.eff.org/deep links/2009/11/stopping-acta-
juggernaut. 
 59.  See Jeremy Malcolm, Public Interest Representation in Global IP Policy 
Institutions 13-17 (Am. Univ. Wash. Coll. of Law, Program on Info. Justice & 
Intellectual Prop., Working Research Paper No. 6, 2010), available at 
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/research/6/ (comparing the capacity of 
certain international organizations to further the development of intellectual 
property policy at the global level and commenting on ACTA’s weaknesses as an 
institutional mechanism). 
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partners.”60 Though negotiating partners may want to be free of 
public relations concerns as they negotiate,61 FOIA has allowed 
national security implications to trump legitimate public concerns 
about the impact of ACTA on domestic law. In so doing, this 
designation has allowed the USTR to deny many ACTA-related 
FOIA requests. These denials, in tandem with the USTR’s apparent 
trend toward maintaining secrecy despite promising transparency, 
have created an environment in which ACTA may very well go 
down as the least transparent international agreement in living 
memory.  
Compounding the problem―and similar to the Fed’s denial of 
FOIA requests regarding $2 trillion in loans to banks, the USTR does 
not seem particularly concerned that the public cannot access 
information about an agreement that could impact every U.S. 
citizen’s rights under copyright law.62 The issues of $2 trillion in 
federal loans, public health and safety in the Gulf of Mexico, and 
lawmaking about basic intellectual property (“IP”) protections have 
national importance and involve close interactions between 
government and the affected private interests. All are situations 
where private commercial interests have secretly been given higher 
priority than the public’s interest in basic information. Moreover, the 
government, aided ironically by FOIA, has amplified the detrimental 
impact on public transparency and accountability through its close 
interactions with interested commercial entities. Therefore, while 
only three examples, albeit significant ones, do not make a trend, 
they do suggest an emerging mode of response to major issues of 
national importance, particularly when a meaningful segment of the 
public could possibly disagree with the official position taken by the 
government. This emerging trend of decreased information flow 
 
 60. Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 20), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1624813. 
 61. Id. (manuscript at 20-21) (quoting ACTA-Summary of Key Elements Under 
Discussion, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/about-
us/press-office/fact-sheets/2009/november/acta-summary-key-elements-under-
discussion). 
 62. See Katz, supra note 58 (criticizing the USTR for its purposefully 
constructed lack of accountability in keeping the ACTA negotiations secret and 
advocating for trade negotiation reform and increased Congressional oversight of 
agencies like USTR). 
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warrants further exploration and monitoring. 
In sum, the examples of Bloomberg, BP, and ACTA indicate that 
FOIA needs to be reconsidered. One may legitimately question 
whether FOIA is up to the task of balancing the public’s interest with 
the interests of the government and its corporate partners. The failure 
to balance public and corporate interests was apparent in the 
government’s multi-trillion dollar loans to financial entities, the 
government’s reliance on BP to clean up the Gulf oil spill, and the 
government’s close consultation with primarily corporate entities on 
matters of international lawmaking in ACTA.63 More specifically, 
FOIA seems to assume an ability to keep and maintain secrets about 
matters of significant public concern that may not be realistic in an 
Internet-dominated, WikiLeaks-prone age. Indeed, as the authors of 
Millennial Makeover suggest, we are due for a reassessment of law 
as a response to the “growth and success of new communication 
technologies.”64 Therefore, along the lines of the Obama 
administration’s early promises to make government more 
transparent,65 FOIA needs to be re-conceptualized to reflect the broad 
information sharing powers and expectations established by the 
Internet. The remainder of this article focuses on facilitation of this 
policymaking process through the lens of ongoing ACTA 
negotiations. 
II. ACTA AND THE INTERNET: SECRECY AND ITS 
PRIMARY THEORETICAL BENEFIT UPENDED 
Despite the efforts for secrecy, some ACTA information has 
leaked to an eager public and, to a lesser extent, has been officially 
 
 63.  The government may not have a perfect mutuality of interest in these 
scenarios, but it is clearly operating as a partner with corporate entities to achieve 
mutually-identified goals. The exact parameters of this balancing are beyond the 
scope of this paper, but are a subject of current research. 
 64. See MORLEY WINOGRAD & MICHAEL D. HAIS, MILLENNIAL MAKEOVER: 
MYSPACE, YOUTUBE, AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS 49 (2008) 
(reviewing “cycles” of American political activity and predicting a “comeback” of 
“activist government” due, in part, to the impact of technological development on 
voter behavior). 
 65. See Change has come to WhiteHouse.gov, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Jan. 20, 
2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/change_has_come_to_whitehouse-gov/ 
(proclaiming the Obama administration’s commitment to transparency and 
announcing the online publication of executive orders and proclamations). 
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released.66 This information, perhaps because it is so unusual to 
receive, has been rapidly disseminated through the Internet.67 Thus, a 
related question is whether attempts at secrecy can be maintained in 
the face of an international negotiation on a far reaching topic―the 
state of IP law―and hidden from a public with a robust and 
pervasive tool with which to communicate and share 
information―the Internet. In other words, can interested parties ever 
reap the benefits of secrecy when there is a strong public interest in 
the concealed information?68 Aside from transparency concerns, 
which may provide a normative policy argument in favor of greater 
disclosure, is secretive behavior nonetheless defensible from a 
practical perspective as a preferred mode of lawmaking? In this 
section, this article proposes that the likely answer is no. 
The lack of disclosure and accountability since the beginning of 
the ACTA negotiations has been roundly criticized. The primary 
concerns have been (1) general erosion of deliberative democracy, 
(2) one-sided input that reflects primary commercial perspectives, (3) 
speculation and guesswork replacing real discussion of the issues, 
and (4) deterioration of the legitimacy of the process and the law 
being created.69 Each of these concerns has played a part in the 
public condemnation of the negotiators’ positions on transparency 
and accountability.70 But what about the primary benefit of 
 
 66. See, e.g., Jane Fae Ozimek, ACTA Leaks - But Secret Squirrel Stays Secret: 
Fingers Point to the USA, THE REGISTER (July 23, 2010), http://www.theregister. 
co.uk/2010/07/23/acta_leak_secrecy/ (suggesting that the secrecy surrounding 
ACTA negotiations is potentially pointless because news about meetings and 
discussions is constantly being leaked). 
 67. See e.g., ACTA WATCH, http://acta.michaelgeist.ca (last visited Mar. 1, 
2011); KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L, http://keionline.org (last visited Mar. 1, 
2011); ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., http://www.eff.org (last visited Mar. 1, 
2011). 
 68. See Aaron X. Fellmeth, The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement in the 
Public Eye, 14(18) ASIL INSIGHT, June 24, 2010, at 1, available at 
http://www.asil.org/files/insight100624pdf.pdf (commenting that while the United 
States is typically secretive in its treaty negotiations, the USTR has begun to feel 
pressure from mounting criticism about the guarded nature of ACTA negotiations); 
see also Ozimek, supra note 66 (opining that leaks signal the futility of keeping 
ACTA negotiations secret). 
 69.  See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text (discussing criticisms of the 
ACTA process as lacking transparency). 
 70. See Yu, supra note 60, at 21 (decrying the government’s decision to 
support certain industries to the detriment of the greater public). 
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secrecy―namely, smooth and efficient negotiations free from 
external influences, which range from “political complications in the 
capitals to opposition from civil society groups?”71 Because the 
Internet exists as a pervasive means to disseminate information on 
issues of significant public concern, the remainder of this paper 
suggests that the benefit of secrecy is difficult, and in some cases 
impossible, to maintain when (1) an issue of significant national 
interest is receiving national attention, and (2) there is an organized 
and technologically-savvy group of interested members of the public 
that are not receiving desired information about the issue. Therefore, 
under these circumstances, governmental policies formulated with an 
assumption of the ability to maintain strong secrecy run a risk of 
failure to the extent that secrecy is fundamental to achieving the 
given goals. 
A. PROBLEMS WITH THE SECRECY ASSUMPTION 
There are several problems with assuming the ability to maintain 
strong secrecy in the ACTA context. Since information was first 
leaked about the mere existence of the ACTA negotiations, concerns 
were raised that ACTA was locked inside the proverbial black box. 
Professor Michael Geist, one of Canada’s leading copyright scholars, 
noted in an early commentary that ACTA “could ultimately prove 
bigger than WIPO―without the constraints of consensus building, 
developing countries, and civil society groups, the ACTA could 
further reshape the IP landscape with tougher enforcement, stronger 
penalties, and a gradual eradication of the copyright and trademark 
balance.”72 
Thus began a concerted effort to grab the most useful information 
about the state of the ACTA―namely, actual drafts of the 
agreement. Despite coordinated international efforts to maintain the 
security of negotiating drafts, at least six full or partial drafts were 
 
 71. Id. at 22; see also EUROPEAN COMM’N, ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE 
AGREEMENT FACT SHEET 4 (2008), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/ 
docs/2009/january/tradoc_142039.pdf (“For reasons of efficiency, it is only natural 
that intergovernmental negotiations dealing with issues that have an economic 
impact, do not take place in public and that negotiators are bound by a certain level 
of discretion.”). 
 72. Is ACTA the New WIPO?, MICHAEL GEIST BLOG (Oct. 24, 2007), 
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/2318/99999. 
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leaked and widely disseminated on the Internet by highly-read 
technology information websites, including Boing Boing and 
WikiLeaks.73  
To be clear, leaks are not a system of public transparency, and the 
information adduced typically cannot be used to offer much 
meaningful input to policymakers. Unsurprisingly, however, the 
USTR did not offer any formal ways for the public to offer input on 
leaked information. Though the public could not obtain a perfect 
picture of the U.S. position, it was simply wishful thinking—from 
the beginning—for the USTR to assert that the public would find out 
how the U.S. position evolved only once the agreement had been 
signed. Indeed, a week before the date of McCoy’s “transparency 
soup” email, which made this assertion, the second leak of an ACTA 
draft had been publicly discussed and analyzed.74 The USTR, 
Ambassador Ron Kirk, also maintained this position in December 
2009, telling KEI’s James Love that the ACTA text would be made 
public “when it is finished.”75 At that time at least four leaks had 
occurred.76 Policymaking based upon wishful thinking cannot lead to 
 
 73. The first leak occurred on May 22, 2008 and was reported by WikiLeaks. 
Proposed US ACTA Multilateral Intellectual Property Trade Agreement (2007), 
WIKILEAKS (May 21, 2008), http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Proposed_US_ACTA_ 
plurilateral_intellectual_property_trade_agreement_%282007%29. The second, 
less substantial leak occurred in February 2009. Putting Together the ACTA 
Puzzle: Privacy, P2P Major Targets, MICHAEL GEIST BLOG (Feb. 3, 2009), 
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/3660/125 [hereinafter ACTA Puzzle]. The 
third leak occurred in April 2009 and was again published on WikiLeaks. The 
fourth, focusing on Internet issues, occurred in November 2009. The ACTA 
Internet Chapter: Putting the Pieces Together, MICHAEL GEIST BLOG (Nov. 3, 
2009), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/4510/99999. The fifth leak was a 
full text draft of the agreement and was leaked in March 2010. ACTA’s De Minimis 
Provision: Countering the iPod Searching Border Guard Fears, MICHAEL GEIST 
BLOG (Mar. 23, 2010), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/4900/125. The 
most recent leak occurred in September 2010. Cory Doctorow, Latest Leaked Draft 
of Secret Copyright Treaty: US Trying To Cram DRM Rules Down the World’s 
Throats, BOING BOING (Sept. 6, 2010, 7:38 AM), http://boingboing.net/ 
2010/09/06/latest-leaked-draft.html. 
 74. See ACTA Puzzle, supra note 73 (noting that although the treaty is not near 
completion, ACTA’s scope appears to encompass multiple chapters ranging from 
enforcement to institutional arrangements); supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 75. James Love, Ambassador Kirk: People Would be “Walking Away from the 
Table” if the ACTA Text is Made Public, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Dec. 3, 
2009, 5:31 PM), http://keionline.org/node/706. 
 76. See supra note 73 (chronicling the various leaks that occurred during the 
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good law, and the realities of the USTR’s limited ability to maintain 
secrecy might explain why negotiators finally caved and released an 
“official” draft text in April 2010. 
Aside from the basic fact that draft texts and portions thereof were 
being leaked in spite of the official stance, another part of the 
problem is that USTR’s support and encouragement of ironclad 
secrecy stands in stark contrast to the approach of other international 
bodies charged with lawmaking in the intellectual property sphere. 
For example, major IP treaty bodies such as the World Health 
Organization (“WHO”), WTO―which includes the Council for the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(“TRIPS”), and the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) publish agendas, lists of participants, 
meeting minutes, and draft documents on their respective web sites.77 
Indeed, as Jeremy Malcolm noted in his recent study of a number of 
international institutions, “even the WTO, the least participatory of 
the organizations studied, posts all of its official documents online, 
and most of the other institutions [including WIPO] also make 
available negotiating texts.”78 Thus, the USTR had virtually no 
precedent for such an extreme maneuver, and the public rightly 
expected more information based upon past precedent.  
Indeed, the strategy inspired Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon to 
write to the USTR in late 2009 asking for the USTR’s specific 
ACTA negotiation positions.79 Upon receiving a response, Wyden 
 
course of the ACTA negotiations). 
 77. See Malcolm, supra note 59, at 15-17 (summarizing the strengths and 
weaknesses of various international organizations with respect to transparency); 
Electronic Frontier Found. et al., ACTA is Secret. How Transparent are other 
Global Norm Setting Exercises? (July 21, 2009), http://www.keionline.org/misc-
docs/4/attachment1_transparency_ustr.pdf (providing examples of transparency 
from the policies and practices of, inter alia, WHO, WTO, WIPO, and 
UNCITRAL). 
 78. See Malcolm, supra note 59, at 17, 20 (concluding that ACTA fails to meet 
the transparency best practices employed by existing intellectual property 
institutions). 
 79. See Letter from Ron Wyden, U.S. Senator, to The Honorable Ron Kirk, 
U.S. Trade Representative (Jan. 6, 2010), available at http://keionline.org/sites/ 
default/files/Wyden_Letter_to_USTR_on_ACTA_Jan_2010.pdf (requesting 
information such as the extent to which USTR was considering the impact of 
negotiation proposals on domestic laws and USTR’s goals regarding ACTA’s 
scope). 
832 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [26:3 
issued a press release in January 2010 in which he noted that he was 
attempting to “shed light” on ACTA’s “secret negotiations” and 
sought to “encourage[ ] [the USTR] to give the public a say over 
issues that so profoundly affect their lives, as trade policies often 
do.”80 The highly unusual action of a Democratic Senator 
challenging an appointee of a Democratic President on a major 
international negotiation, combined with the stark differences in 
negotiation transparency and accountability between ACTA and all 
other major international IP agreements of recent vintage, suggests 
that the USTR’s apparent strategy of extreme secrecy was a non-
starter. 
Despite the possibility of a streamlined process where public input 
is virtually non-existent and a hand-picked group of advisors 
periodically offers counsel to the USTR, evidence suggests that 
ACTA has actually taken longer to negotiate than many similar 
international IP agreements.81 Assuming that ACTA negotiations 
began in June 2008 and as of this writing have not yet concluded, 
these negotiations have taken over two and a half years. While this is 
not an excessive amount of time to negotiate a multilateral 
international agreement, KEI notes that it is longer than negotiations 
for nine of sixteen multilateral IP agreements.82 Thus, while there are 
many factors that affect the speed with which a treaty is negotiated, it 
is at least questionable whether the efforts at secrecy, however 
flawed, have actually streamlined the negotiation process. Stated 
differently, the fact that WIPO and WTO are more transparent, yet 
have been able to facilitate the conclusion of major recent 
international IP agreements in comparable or less time than ACTA, 
challenges the notion that secrecy inevitably leads to a streamlined 
 
 80. Malini Aisola, USTR Responds to Senator Wyden’s Letter on ACTA, 
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Mar. 2, 2010, 5:01 PM), http://keionline.org/ 
node/791. 
 81. See Alberto Cerda, How Much Time is Necessary to Negotiate the Text of a 
Multilateral Agreement on Intellectual Property?, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L 
(June 4, 2010, 12:03 PM), http://keionline.org/node/861 (outlining the negotiation 
histories of major international IP treaties). 
 82. See id. (“[T]he time to negotiate the text of [an] agreement generally took 
less than four years, and in many cases, less than two years.”). For example, the 
1996 WIPO Internet treaties were negotiated in less than two years, whereas 
WTO’s TRIPS, arguably the most significant IP treaty, was concluded in 1993 
after three and a half years of negotiations. Id. 
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and efficient negotiation process in IP lawmaking.  
Aside from the questionable practical impact of excessive secrecy, 
the USTR’s position is rendered even more untenable simply 
because it does not meet current expectations of a transparent and 
accountable government. The Internet has raised public expectations 
of what transparency and accountability look like, and policymakers 
ignore this shift at their peril. Indeed, as illustrated during the ACTA 
negotiations, interested parties can force transparency where little or 
none is officially desired.83 Once transparency is forced by the 
public, any administrative efforts to realistically control disclosure 
become tainted. Hence, the USTR’s largely unsuccessful efforts to 
maintain black box secrecy can be dismissed as little more than an 
effort to prevent the public from knowing about its lawmaking 
activities.  
Indeed, as KEI’s James Love explained to Ambassador Kirk in 
December 2009, receiving the text after it was concluded “was too 
late, and the public wanted the text out now, before it’s too late to 
influence anything.”84 Only time will tell whether the final draft 
reflects scholars’ and practitioners’ indirect input, offered through 
the analysis of leaked texts and more recent “official” versions.85 
Nonetheless, despite this uncertainty and USTR’s efforts to shield 
the negotiation process from the public, this has not been a process 
wholly devoid of public input. At a minimum, the public has 
compelled some disclosure and forced the USTR and other 
negotiating parties to defend the official policy of not releasing drafts 
and other valuable information.86  
 
 83. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (detailing the numerous leaks of 
ACTA despite attempts by the negotiating parties to preserve secrecy). 
 84. See Love, supra note 75 (describing how the interaction between Love and 
Ambassador Kirk―which occurred while the two were seated next to each other 
on an airplane―was reported in a number of major Internet news outlets including 
Tech Dirt, Wired, Boing Boing, and Slashdot, which further attests to the ability of 
the Internet to quickly disseminate information to an interested community). 
 85. See PIJIP Research Paper Series, AM. U. WASH. C. L. DIGITAL COMMONS, 
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/research (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) 
(listing numerous academic papers investigating issues surrounding ACTA’s 
negotiations and substantive provisions). 
 86. See Love, supra note 75 (reporting that Ambassador Kirk responded to 
criticisms about transparency by saying that certain parties would “walk[] away 
from the table” if the ACTA negotiations were not secret); see also Sean Flynn, 
ACTA to Meet Sept. 23: Locking Out Civil Society?, PROGRAM ON INFO. JUST. & 
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Although Love also quotes Ambassador Kirk as stating that “the 
issue of transparency was ‘about as complicated as it can get,’” one 
commenter on Love’s interaction with Kirk retorts that 
“[t]ransparency is only a complicated issue when you’re being 
dishonest.”87 This unsympathetic response is to be expected, as here, 
the USTR has employed extreme and unprecedented efforts to keep 
secret a major international negotiation aiming to create new law and 
international enforcement institutions on a hot-button issue like 
copyright piracy. Because of its forceful attempts to maintain 
unprecedented levels of secrecy, the USTR must expect a negative 
public reaction once the existence of the negotiations is revealed. 
Whether this commenter’s view reflects reality is secondary to the 
fact that it is a logical reaction to the USTR’s unparalleled efforts to 
keep an international lawmaking negotiation process secret.  
The failure of the USTR to maintain the black box as part of its 
“you’ll-find-out-when-it’s-done” method of lawmaking has 
demonstrated its weakness as a law-making modality. Real-time 
disclosure of information is both expected and key to a deliberative 
democracy, and the USTR’s efforts reflect a policy that is opposed to 
such disclosure. Naturally, offering input on drafts after they have 
been negotiated is not as valuable as having the opportunity to do so 
before the parties settle on an agreement’s core goals and terms. 
While some secrecy is to be expected and may even be desirable, for 
ACTA, the USTR’s secrecy efforts denied any opportunity for 
substantively meaningful real-time input from the public with little 
or no countervailing benefit to the USTR or its negotiating partners. 
Putting aside the reality in which organized citizens have access to 
the greatest system of information sharing ever invented, the USTR 
curtailed democratic legitimacy and public buy-in on the laws 
enacted, and its position is therefore difficult to defend. 
The existence of the Internet broadly, and WikiLeaks specifically, 
only exacerbates the failings of USTR’s policy. Once we engraft the 
Internet, organizations at war with secrecy like WikiLeaks, and an 
organized, technologically savvy, and interested public onto these 
 
INTELL. PROP. (Sept. 21, 2010, 10:08 AM), http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/ 
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USTR has reacted to the public by starting to release some documents, including 
meeting agendas). 
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legitimacy problems, the USTR’s position becomes not only 
damaging to democracy, but nearly impossible to achieve. Indeed, as 
seen in ACTA, increased public condemnation and outcry forced 
some begrudging disclosure and led to something less than a smooth 
and efficient process. In sum, the USTR’s policy has proven to be 
little more than wishful thinking regarding a bad idea and should be 
abandoned in future international negotiations. 
CONCLUSION 
Going back to Jeremy Bentham and even earlier, the theoretical 
bases against secrecy in a democracy have been known and 
articulated.88 During ACTA negotiations, secrecy’s modern practical 
limitations in a democracy have been shown. Today, it should be 
received wisdom that the kind of secrecy possible before the advent 
of the Internet—the proverbial “black box”—is increasingly difficult 
to maintain and, therefore, from a practical perspective, should not 
be part of lawmakers’ considerations in deciding how best to create 
and enact law. Indeed, the mainstream media understands this point 
well. In the promotion of its political comedy series The Thick of It, 
the BBC noted that: 
If [twenty-four] hours is “a long time in politics,” the two decades since 
Yes, Prime Minister [a 1980s BBC show] now seem like light years ago. 
So when The Thick of It first appeared in 2005, it was well overdue. 
Secrets are harder to keep in this age of cell phone cameras, blogs and 
Tweets.89 
Absolute secrecy cannot be maintained, especially regarding a 
controversial issue like anti-piracy enforcement in the international 
context.90 This paper points out that the leaks and resulting opaque 
“transparency soup”—or partial, uncontrolled and haphazard 
 
 88. See Levine, supra note 49, at 158-59 (remarking that nineteenth century 
scholars like Bentham acknowledged that openness and transparency increase 
governmental efficiency and help to ensure that the electorate can make informed 
voting choices). 
 89. Putting you “In the Loop” about The Thick of It, BBC AM. (Apr. 29, 2010), 
http://www.bbcamericashop.com /blog/dvds-in-the-works/2010/04/29/putting-you-
%E2%80%9Cin-the-loop%E2%80%9D-about-the-thick-of-it. 
 90. See Jonathan Lynn, States Clash over Anti-Counterfeiting Enforcement, 
REUTERS (June 9, 2010), http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-49179920100609 
(reporting on the controversial nature of certain ACTA proposals). 
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secrecy—upend the main benefits associated with secrecy, 
particularly streamlining and efficiency. These benefits can only be 
achieved by maintaining the black box, an outcome which has 
proven difficult―and in cases like ACTA, impossible―in 2011.  
A post-hoc disclosure of information―whether authorized or by 
leak―seems to primarily discredit the withholding institutions when 
they have not allowed for the benefit of meaningful real-time public 
input at the critical point when policy is being formulated and laws 
written. For example, the kind of secrecy envisioned by the USTR 
needlessly created an adversarial relationship with the public that 
reinforced the worst fears and criticisms about current lawmakers. 
Simultaneously, leaks and official drafts were released in the midst 
of the purported black box policy. This resulted in the public being 
afforded a less efficient mode of lawmaking, and led them to lose 
faith in the institutions involved. 
Combined with the reality that governments, particularly 
administrative agencies, and private industry often have a strong 
mutuality of interest in keeping information regarding matters of 
significant national concern from the public, it seems that the 
structure of FOIA needs to be reconsidered. As economist Alfred E. 
Kahn explained, when an administrative commission is responsible 
for the performance of an industry, it is under nearly inescapable 
pressure to protect the health of the companies it regulates.91 The 
agency naturally seeks desirable performance from the entities over 
which it exercises authority, and tends to prefer its own controls 
rather than the unpredictable forces of competition.92 As the 
examples discussed in this article illustrate, limiting transparency can 
be seen broadly as part of the “controls” used to shield commercial 
entities and their regulators from public scrutiny, second-guessing, 
and accountability. If the prevailing opinion within commercial and 
administrative entities is that a lack of public input in relevant policy 
decisions maintains or increases the commercial “health” of the 
regulated industries, as may be indicated by the above examples, 
 
 91. See ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND 
INSTITUTIONS 11-13 (1988) (“Responsible for the continued provision and 
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then the competing values and capture of administrative entities by 
commercial interests is a problem long-overdue to be addressed. 
In sum, it is both damaging to democracy and untenable to 
maintain a FOIA that allows fundamental information about the 
expenditure of taxpayer dollars, health and safety risks associated 
with a clean-up of a major oil spill, and lawmaking itself to be 
withheld from the public. This is particularly true in an environment 
where the sharing of information is getting increasingly simple, 
pervasive, and expected. While a certain level of secrecy is necessary 
and even desirable in the functioning of government, as reflected 
generally (if not perfectly) in the exemptions to FOIA,93 excessive 
and unjustified secrecy, as seen in the above examples, is 
problematic and concerning. Indeed, the ACTA negotiations have 
proven that lawmaking on issues of significant national concern 
becomes bogged down, rather than streamlined and improved, when 
antiquated laws and assumptions about secrecy merge. This article 
seeks to advance this simple, but important point, so that 
policymakers can move on to the next, more challenging, question: 
How do we update FOIA, acknowledging the close partnership 
between government and the private sector and its impact on what 
information is and is not disclosed to the public? If this issue is taken 
up by Congress, the unfortunate experience of the ACTA negotiation 
process might be the impetus for meaningful change in how the 
United States conceives its version of democracy. We would have 
fewer “distractions,” and, by virtue of policymakers getting the 
benefit of meaningful, real-time public input, we might draft better, 
more balanced, and more legitimate IP laws—and laws generally. 
 
 93. 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (2006). Indeed, this author is currently researching and 
writing on the blurring and merger of national security and commercial interests 
under FOIA—and what technology can do about it. 
